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The ability of military contracting officers to deliver
required weapons and supplies at the right place and at the
right time has a paramount consequence upon the defense posture
of our military establishment. Not only do late deliveries up-
set planned schedules but, moreover, they threaten the readiness
of our operating forces. Accordingly, caution should be heeded
in insuring that reasonable purchasing regulations are not
supplemented with complex requirements that impede expeditious
procurement action.
It will be the purpose of this paper to define the
applicability of the two types of procurement used by the
Defense Department, negotiation and formal advertising, and
to cite some controversial elements. A brief historical
resume is presented for introduction and information. An
effort will be directed towards examining the required condi-
tions for the use of either negotiation or formal advertising,
and it will be pointed out when each method is effective and
when it is not.
The recommendations included are advanced for consi-
deration and possible adoption. It is believed that their
implementation will greatly enhance procurement effectiveness.
During my extensive research on this subject, which
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has always provided me with a student's interest, I visited
numerous Navy purchasing specialists, I wish to express
my gratitude particularly to the following who were very
helpful and generous with their times CDR John M. Malloy,
SC, USN, Staff Director ASPR Division, Office of Secretary
of Defense; LCDR S. E. Swenson, SC, USN, Purchasing Officer,
Naval Air Material Center, Philadelphia; and Mr. G. D. Fogle,
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During the past decade, while the Armed Forces Procure-
ment Act of 19^7 has served as law for Defense Department con-
tracting officers, considerable agitation has been aroused on
Capitol Hill about the abuses and alleged inequities in pro-
curement by negotiation. Certain legislators have the fixed
opinion that procurement by formal advertising is the only
fair, democratic manner of procurement and that the best in-
terests of the public and government will be served by solicit-
ing the preponderance of military requirements by the formal
advertising method. As the Hebert Committee stated in its
1June 15, 1957 reports
The essential point for discussion is whether it
shall be the national policy to vest in the sole dis-
cretion of procurement officers of varying degrees
of experience, capabilities, maturity and permanence,
an annual procurement program in the neighborhood of
$18 billion, to such a degree that more than 92 per
cent of these dollars shall be spent by so-called
negotiation.
We must decide whether we have developed such
U. S., Congress, House, Subcommittee for Special
Investigations of the Committee on Armed Forces, Report on
Study of Armed Services Procurement Act, Title 10 , U. S.
Code Chapter 157 , 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957 s pp. 642-643.

skilled and experienced contracting officers and
Government negotiators under conditions of shifting
or rotation of personnel and limited opportunities
for business experience, that the Government has
qualified personnel in sufficient numbers to carry
on a program of such magnitude, in "negotiations",
opposite the skilled, experienced, and permanently
employed representatives of American manufacturing
concerns; whether, in such circumstances, the
Government will come off better or worse financially
on the product it receives and the prices it pays,
than if American businesses competed among themselves
by sealed bidding, with Government acting as arbiter
rather than participant
.
The Defense Department, on the other hand, has
endeavored to apprise the Congress of the practical need
for extensive use of the negotiation method, but the recur-
rence of highlighted exception cases has sustained vigorous
Congressional inquiry.
The debatable question asked is: Should the Armed
Services Procurement Act be amended to place the negotiation
method of procurement on the same status level as the formal
advertising method?
Historical Background
In i860, legislation was passed by Congress (Section
3709 of the Revised Statutes )which restricted military pur-
chasing, with narrowed exceptions, to the formal advertising
method, which required solicitation of competitive bids and
formal award to the lowest responsible and responsive bidder.
Thereafter, until 19^7> a hodgepodge of supplemental and rigid
procurement laws were amassed covering special situations, and
directed towards emphasizing advertised sealed bidding as the

3norm for procurement. When the military expansion program
commenced in 19^0, it was realized that the procurement regu-
lations were too unwieldy to cope with the need for accelerated
procurements in war preparation. As a result, Public Law 671,
known as the Speed-Up Law, was passed; however, the President
restricted negotiation, permitted by the Act, to cases meeting
certain conditions and required each contract reviewed for
approval by the Service Secretary. Between 194-2 and the Armed
Services Procurement Act of 19^7 (passed in February 1948) the
Services negotiated nearly all requirements under authority of
the First War Powers Act and Executive Order 9001. During the
Korean War and until June 30, 1958 the negotiation authority
was based upon reinstatement of Title II of the First War
Powers Act by Public Law 982, 81st Congress and by continuing
legislation. However, the Defense Department followed the
authority of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 194-7 as a
general rule, and used the authority of Title II of the First
War Powers Act only in a few instances where it was more
appropriate.
Present Law
The Armed Forces Procurement Act of 194-7 specifies
that traditional formal advertising will be the general method
of purchasing, but negotiation may be used in 17 delineated
exceptions. It would appear then that in the minds of Congress

4negotiation as a purchase method does not enjoy the same
"respectability" and "dignity" as the formal advertised
method, and it is permitted only as an exception. Neverthe-
less, the Armed Forces have been able to live with the Act
which has proved adequate, though cumbersome, in meeting the





Growth of Negotiation Procedure
Since enactment of the Armed Services Procurement Act
of 19^7 , the percent of negotiated has increased sharply,
though it has remained fairly constant for the past several
years. During fiscal year 1959 Defense Department negotiated
contracts amounted to 95.1$ of the total 5.8 million actions
and 78.8$ of the total money value ($16.2 billion). Table 1
presents a detailed breakdown of procurement actions during
fiscal year 1959 by type, dollar values and extent of compe-
tition. With further progress towards a "push button" military
organization, the complexity of weapons will continue to grow,
and more and more advanced equipment will be demanded for the
operating forces.
A recent staff report provided the Congressional
Joint Economic Committee contained the following information
relating to Defense Department procurement during fiscal year
1959;
Only 70 percent of the dollar value of procurement
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1. For technical or specialized supplier requiring
substantial initial investment or extended period of
preparation for manufacturers, 33 percent.
2» For experimental development and research con-
tracts, 18<>9 percent.
3. As impractical to secure competition by formal
advertising, 18.6 percent. 2
Defense department witnesses at Congressional hearings
have testified that the Services have religiously complied with
the Armed Services Procurement Act provisions and that the
relatively few deviations uncovered were caused by people
taking unwarranted liberties or calculated risks. Further,
that the bulk of purchasing personnel are loyal, trustworthy
and dedicated. Regulations should be tailored to facilitate
the purchase function, and not be complicated and restrictive
in an attempt to curb every human failing. The Hebert Commit-
tee, after looking at procurement directives and instructions
"and the many obligations assumed by a contracting officer",
said! "These are hazards great enough to justify something
like flight pay. "3 Since these regulations are so extensive
and often subject to varied interpretation, the contracting
officer must always be prepared to support his decisions by
detailed facts. His personal judgment is restricted and
stifled due to the rigidity of procurement directives.
2
American Enterprise Association Inc., Bill Analysis—
Proposals to Amend Military Procurement Statute's". 86th Cong . .
2d Sess.. Report No. 6 . March 21, I960, p. 10, citing
Background Material on Economic Aspects of Military Procurement
and Supply , Committee Print, February 16, I960, p. 86.
3Army-Navy-Air Force Journal , January 23, I960, p. 11.

8Figure 1 points up the complex range of legal "hurdles" a
contracting officer is faced with.
Inasmuch as the Defense Department has literally
followed current regulations for a decade and has statistical
evidence that negotiation is absolutely required for a large
majority of procurements, the limitations and practical use
of formal advertising should be assessed further by advocates
of formal advertising. Negotiation is a logical and practical
manner today of buying the vast and complex military needs,
and this existing fact should be acknowledged and understood.
The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Materiel,
4testifying on January 14, 1956 observed:
The bulk of the items we buy does not lend itself
to the use of the formally advertised method of pro-
curement. This, in effect, was recognized in the
Armed Services Procurement Act of 19^7 which author-
ized the use of negotiation in placing contracts for
the Incredibility complex weapons which the times
require.
The complicated weapons and related research and
development which we procure (a) involve continuous
technological breakthroughs in the state of the art;
(b) require continuous engineering during the production
stage to improve performance, safety and producibility;
(c) preclude the preparation of detailed specifications
as a basis for purchase action; (d) make difficult the
determination of estimated costs so that special contract
techniques must be used; and (e) require huge investments
in production facilities, the duplication of which would
be tremendously costly to the country.
Briefly, the military department purchases are confined
to the following three broad categories of items:-5
^House Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services,
Report on Study of ASFA
. 1957, p. 672.
15
U. S. Congress, Senate, Procurement Subcommittee of
the Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Procurement
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1. Items which are identical with those required
by other Government agencies, such as furniture, housekeeping
supplies and tires.
2. Commercial type items and items of conventional
military equipment capable of being produced by many suppliers.
These include clothing, hardware and petroleum.
3. Items of research and development nature, and
production of complex military weapons and equipment.
Often the Defense Department is unfairly criticized by
the statement that 95 percent of the procurement is done with-
out competition. This charge is misleading and does not tell
the full story. First, procurement actions only and not money
value are considered. To be sure, only 4„9 percent of the buys
are by formal advertising, but this amounts to 21 percent of
the total dollars spent. Second, it ignores the fact that
82.9 percent of all purchase actions are small purchases that
are negotiated since the administrative costs of formal adver-
tising would be prohibitive in consideration of the small value
of the items. Third, the assumption that negotiation is not
competitive is erroneous. And fourth, it does not account for









The following criteria, according to John Perry Miller,
Professor of Economics at Yale, must be present for advertising
to be applicable or effectives'
1. Adequate descriptions of what is to be
purchased; this suggests an item that is reasonably
stable in design, and that by whomever produced, will
be essentially the same, including the minimal quality.
2. The specifications of the item are realistic
and "honest "; that is, not beyond Industry capability,
nor tailored to a particular source, but capable of
being met by a number of producers.
3. The details of the item may be publicized .
not being restricted by security classifications or
by proprietary design.
4. That more than one qualified source is willing
to submit a bid and to undertake the supply.
5. That the basis for selecting the successful
bidder could be solely on the price offered.
Limitations
These criteria apply mainly to standard items or to
those items with a repetitive procurement history that have
developed static specifications. They rarely apply to buying
B. Edelman, "How Procurement is Accomplished Today",
Procurement by Negotiation or Formal Advertising , Presentations




new weapons that have not been perfected or previously
procured. Formal advertising is ideal for purchasing general
stores supplies, fuel, provisions, General Service Administra-
tion warehouse items and similar system stock items, which in
recent years have been placed under Single Manager procurement
or procurable through the GSA. As long as these criteria are
satisfied, formal advertising is an appropriate and effective
means of procurement.
In past years in peace-time the services built their
own prototypes "in house" at such activities as the Naval Gun
Factory and the Naval Aircraft Factory, during which time de-
tailed specifications could be prepared and formal advertising
would be possible since no urgency existed. That situation,
however, does not exist today. Now, with the everchanging
technology and the need to expedite an idea from the thought
stage to the production stage, there is no time to allot to
"messaging" and perfecting specifications. Instead, research
and development contracts are awarded at the soonest possible
time through negotiations, so that the engineering talent of
civilian industry may be capitalized upon. Nor can the produc-
tion of advanced weaponry be curtailed because of the lack of
elaborate, all-inclusive specifications. There is only enough
time to provide prospective suppliers with bare data, supple-
mented by conversations, so that there is a meeting of the minds
and the objectives are understood. Such expedient purchase
action does not fall within the realm of formal advertising.

13
Another factor to realize is that the military has
shifted from the past repetitive
,
production-type contracting.
Today ? even numerous first-buy contracts are cut back or
canceled due to rapid obsolescense, so that many weapons
are bought only on a "one shot" basis due to supersedure.
Upon receipt of a request to purchase an item, the
contracting officer must decide what type of purchase action
is appropriate--formal advertising or negotiation. He must
seek answers to the following type questions; Just what is the
quality of the specifications? Are they definite or indefi-
nite? Would they result In a bad advertised procurement?
Are all possible sources able to meet contingencies--i.e.
,
investments, tooling, engineering, etc? Should competition
be made on price? Does one company have such an edge as to
preclude real competition, such as substantial initial invest-
ment in facilities, etc? Or, is only one company in a position
to meet the delivery requirements? Have you really a basis
for arriving at a price? Invariably, after thorough analysis,
any contracting officer would come to the conclusion that in
general formal advertising is a satisfactory procurement
method only for those items which have been produced many
times before by many people. Of course there are exceptions,
such as GSSO type items, simple machine part items and the
like.
Appendix I illustrates the thorough type of documenta-
tion prepared by a buyer at the Naval Air Material Center,

14
Philadelphia, in determining the feasible method of procure-
ment. All questions must be carefully considered and answer-
ed. Formal advertising must be used as the norm, and the
freedom of purchasing by negotiation is permitted only to
a limited degree. Not only must certain Findings and Deter-
minations often be made in justification of the use of nego-
tiation, and contracting formalities observed, but also the
contemplated purchase must fall within one of the allowed
categories specifically set forth in the Armed Services
Procurement Act. Before the contracting officer decides
that the formal advertising method is appropriate, he must
be certain that he is capable of completely describing the
full needs of the Government in the invitation for bids.




(1) all persons have an equal right to compete for
Government contracts; (2) unjust favoritism, or
collusion or fraud, be eliminated in the letting
of contracts; and (3) the Government should secure
benefits that arise from widespread competition.
To accomplish these purposes, Invitations for Bids,
together with the specifications and other conditions
incorporated therein, must be such as to permit
competitors to compete on a common basis. This
concept of insuring that all prospective bidders be
able to compete on a common basis is, perhaps, the
most important and exacting requirement of the formal
8U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of the General
Counsel, Navy Contract Law (NAVEXOS P-1995). 2d ed .. (Washington
U. S. Government Printing Office), p. 117.
CDR John M. Malloy, SC , USN, "Procurement By Formal
Advertising—A Critical Analysis" (Unpublished thesis No.
78, Industrial College of the Armed Services, 1958), p. 8.
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advertising method of procurement. It means that
the preparation of each invitation for bids is
often the most difficult and exacting step In an
advertised procurement.
Specification Restrictions
Definite and complete specifications must be included
in the formal advertising Invitation for Bid to insure full
and free competition, even though these specifications may-
be of a specific performance or the combination type. The
Comptroller General has stated in substance "that specifica-
tions generally must define the item to be furnished in suffi-
cient terms that each bid will be for substantially the same
product or service, so that all bidders may compete on a
common basis and assure the Government the lowest available
price.' Although the prospective bidder may obtain an
interpretation of the specifications from the contracting
officer, he cannot be provided any individual information
which would give him advantage over other bidders. According-
ly, all bidders have an equal opportunity to compete.
The pattern of procurement selected is related to
the type of specifications provided and the factors that
Influenced their preparation. Though specifications may be
purely design or performance in nature, they are generally a
combination. Unless a performance specification can be made
tight and be subject to uniform interpretation, it cannot
be successfully used in formal advertising. Normally design
Ibid . . p. 10, citing Decisions of the Comptroller
General, 32 C.G. 384.
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specifications or a combination are used in soliciting
advertised bids.
It would be foolhardy and a waste of valuable time
and manpower for the services to use talented engineers to
produce voluminous design specifications in an effort to
increase formal advertising. The present engineers are
already overburdened with advanced projects and revising
existing specifications due to improved modifications. In-
dustry engineering services are already in being and it would
be a duplication at unwarranted expense for the Government
to generate massive, detailed specifications that undoubtedly
would be fast obsolete. The excessive use of specifications
in the military prompted the following criticism in A Nation's
Business (October 1958) magazine article entitled "Use Per-
ilformance Standards Instead of Detail Specifications":
Fantastically detailed specifications are drawn
for even the simplest defense supplies in accordance
with the Armed Services Procurement Act. The speci-
fication sometimes takes years to prepare. Specifi-
cations for a self-locking nut, for example, cover
34 pages. An electric cable takes 103 pages to describe.
The specifications for an Army field jacket are detailed
in 21 pages. And requirements for an electron tube
take 190 pages to list.
Though the Congressional testimony regarding this comment re-
vealed some inaccuracy of fact, It does, nevertheless, reflect
public concern over excessive detailed specifications. Further,
12
as Secretary McGuire commented, "... I am sure we have bad
11
U. S. Congress, House, Subcommittee for Special
Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services, Hearings .
Cataloging and Standardization Under Public Law 436-82d Congress ,
85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958, p. 781.
12Ibid .» p. 784.
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specifications—>we know of specifications we are trying to
correct that really don't make sense," which evidences that
the Defense Department Is having critical problems even on
specifications for standard type items.
Specifications require the laborious task of continual
review to keep current. New technology, Improved materials
and designs dictate frequent supersedure of specifications.
Often it is discovered through difficult experience that
specifications are overspecif led, too rigid, and pose a
hazard.
Mr. Dean Ammer, Executive Editor of Purchasing
Magazine, testified as follows on how tight specifications
13
may work to the disadvantage of the government;
This J bolt was rigidly specified by engineers
of this company as an item turned out on a screw
machine. If advertised bidding were followed, that
rigid specification would have to be adhered to at
all times. A specialty supplier came in, and, using
the technique of competitive negotiation, was able
to offer the same Item at almost 90 percent reduction.
This item, made by a specialty supplier by a process
called thread rolling, which Just shoots it in and
out in one pass instead of elaborately turning it on
a machine, costs 1.5 oents as against approximately
11.5 cents.
A contracting officer once related to this writer
the difficulty of obtaining NORTON abrasive wheels by formal
advertising. The NORTON type was used by the machinists in
13
U. S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee
on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Procurement on S. 500 .
S. 1383 and S. 1875 . 86th Cong. . 1st Sess.. 1959. p. 443.
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the shops over the years because they had proven to be
far superior and reliable. Yet, it was impossible to
prepare a specification that would include the quality
resulting from the NORTON process. Other abrasive wheels
that met the existing specifications, and were lower priced,
had to be accepted and were used reluctantly. Many more
wheels were used to perform an equal amount of work.
Realities of Award to Lowest Bidder
According to law, the award on formal advertising
must be given to the lowest, responsible bidder who meets the
minimum specification. As explained in Navy Contract Law: 1
Only under rare and special conditions may a
bid be accepted that takes exception to the invitation
for bids or may a bid be changed after the public
opening; and only under peculiar circumstances may
mistakes or irregularities in bids be rectified.
Seldom can such important bargaining factors as
quality, price, and business reputation be unres-
trictedly considered by the Government's purchasing
officer; and seldom can there be any give and take,
between buyer and seller., over the inclusion and word-
ing of contract clauses. Each transaction is entered
at arm's length and is carried out with virtually no
opportunity for negotiating the deal itself or the
particular terms of the deal.
Quality is no factor, except as far as it conforms
to the bare requirements of the specification. The fact that
Government would be getting more value at a slightly higher
price is immaterial. Congressional attitude in the U. S.
House of Representatives favoring formal advertising on the
14
Department of the Navy, Navy Contract Law
(NAVEXOS P-1995 ). pp. 115-16.
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basis of lowest cost is reflected in the following s ^
This committee is of the firm belief that, as
a general matter, this method gives the best assurance
that (a) the Government as a purchaser will receive
the best bargain available, and (b) suppliers in a
position to furnish the Government's requirements
will have a fair and equal opportunity to compete
for a share in the Government s business.
Ironically, it is interesting to note the following
varied sentiment expressed during the same period in the
16
U. S. Senate:
However, the committee also recognizes that
during the time this legislation has been in effect
a substantial number of strict administrative inter-
pretations have been made, out of which has grown the
present traditional approach that Government contracts
must be awarded primarily on a lowest price basis,
irrespective of the best public interest or a lower
ultimate cost. While existing law does not require
this result, it is nevertheless a fact. Take } for
example, the contracting officer who determines that
a low price is less important in a particular procure-
ment than other valid factors, such as urgency of
need, quality of product, or lower ultimate cost.
Should he make an award on such a basis to someone
other than the lowest bidder, he is Immediately placed
on the defensive and must justify his action or might
even be personally charged for the apparent excess
cost. This attitude has had the only result which
could be expected—the award of contracts in a purely
mechanical way to the lowest bidder with no exercise
of judgment or discretion on the part of the purchasing
officer. The committee is firmly of the opinion that
this is not in all cases the best way to conduct business.
15
U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Report 109, Facilitating Procurement of Supplies and Services
by the War and Navy Departments , 80th Cong., 1st Sess.,
19^7, p. 3.
"I £
U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Report No. 571, Armed Services Procurement Act of 194? ,
80th Cong., 1st Session, p. 2.
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Inasmuch as price is the single factor In deciding
a formal advertised award to responsive and responsible
bidders, there Is a tendency for "cut-throat" competition
on prices j and inferior items that are provided barely meet
the specification standards. Good, reputable suppliers are
easily discouraged from seeking government business. The old
axiom "You get what you pay for" Is a truism even for Govern-
ment procurement. Suppliers endeavor to furnish the cheapest
product they have that falls within the loosest literal inter-
pretation of the requirements 30 that profits may be maximized.
What the supplier actually offers under formal advertising is,
in the main, the lewest quality item on hi3 shelf or that he
can produce. Since specifications cannot describe all details,
items are generally fabricated by tailoring manufacturing
operations to cut costs by using inferior materials and con-
struction. Durability and quality are well-nigh impossible
to spell out in specifications and many suppliers are not
concerned with their product reputation when bidding on mili-
tary formal advertised procurements.
The firm restrictions imposed by law upon specifications
17for formal advertising are stated succinctly as follows?
Specifications must be drawn with regard for
the actual minimum needs of the Government and may
not reflect mere administrative preferences for
a particular make or brand, or favor the product
of any individual or class of suppliers over others.
The test is what is required, not what may be
17
Department of the Navy, Navy Contract Law
(NAVEXOS P-1995), PP. 57-58.
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desired. . . . Even where the Comptroller General
has acquiesced in the use of an "or equal" purchase
description because undue difficulty would be
encountered in drafting detailed specifications,
he has required that the invitation state in plain
and simple terms the essential requirements and
minimum needs of the Government as to the specified
item and the extent to which deviations from the
specified item will be acceptable.
The influence of this "Minimum quality—lowest price"
philosophy creates a situation which makes it difficult for
the Government to take advantage of new developments , current
know-how of Industry, better quality and other factors which
effect value. Unfortunately , the people who specify and deter-
mine requirements do not always have the benefit of knowledge
of what is on the market which becomes available to the con-
tracting people during a purchase action, and the administrative
action required to change requirements under the present law
often times seem to those en the scene to be impractical.
Under formal advertising the contracting officer is
limited to accepting only conforming bids, but he may waive
informalities in bids. The Comptroller General's decision
l ftin this matter is in parts u
The primary question for determination in
this and similar cases is whether the deviation
proposed to be waived goes to the substance of the
bid so as to affect either the price, quantity, or
quality of the articles offered and therefore is
prejudicial to the rights of other bidders or is
merely a matter of form or some immaterial variation
from the exact requirements of the specifications
such as would not affect either the price, quality,
or quantity of the articles offered.
18
Ibid., p. 83, citing 17 Comptroller General
Decision 554, 558, 559.
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In other words, any bid that does not meet the essential
requirements of the invitation for bid must be disqualified
so that all bidders will be competing on an equal basis.
However, subsequent to the opening of bids, at which
time the prices are announced, no offeror may retrieve his
bid. If this were permitted, the privilege would be an open
invitation for fraud by the bidders. Nevertheless, when a
bidder has truly made a mistake in bid and can prove his
intention beyond doubt, they may, depending upon the circum-
stances, withdraw the bid or make correction of the bid. But
if the mistake cannot actually be substantiated, it remains
subject to acceptance by the offeree, the Government. ^
Under the negotiation procurement procedure, the bidder can
alter the particulars of his proposal at any time and has the
option of withdrawing his proposal if he desires. Also, under
negotiation, he can discuss all requirement details in full;
whereas, under formal advertising there is no chance after
bid opening to discuss various possible interpretations to
insure a meeting of the minds.
Deciding Responsibility of Bidders
Contracting officers have often tried to restrict
bidders to those having certain minimum standards of experience
and performance. The Comptroller General has declared this





not include unreasonable requirements which would restrict
the eligibility of suppliers. Though this is the general
rule, the Comptroller General has allowed a few special
exceptions. 20 Of course, where at all possible, contracting
officers may require suppliers to have their products pre-
tested for placement on the Qualified Products List as a
condition of eligibility to bid.
It is very difficult for a contracting officer to
disqualify a marginal producer as non-responsible. Further,
the General Accounting Office has stated that it will review
the cases of low-bidders rejected as non-responsible, and the
burden of proof is on the Contracting Officer. Accordingly,
many contracts are awarded to questionable bidders because
it is just too difficult and time consuming to do otherwise. ±
Just because a contractor has been delinquent in the past and
in the contracting officer's Judgment is unreliable, he cannot
be rejected just on that basis as non-responsible. The fact
that the lowest bidder never actually produced the item before
is also no reason for disqualification unless the Qualified
Products List (QPL) provision is applicable. In this connec-
tion, it is recognized that even if a supplier makes an item
once and is placed on the QPL, it doesn't necessarily mean he
is capable of producing the same again. This fact has been




MaHoy , p. 18.
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Congressional sentiment with regard to the deter-
mination of whether a particular dealer is a responsible
22bidder has been expressed as follows
s
The question whether a particular dealer is a
responsible bidder requires sound business judgment,
and involves an evaluation of the bidder's experience,
facilities, technical organization, reputation, finan-
cial resources, and other factors. The service
concerned with the procurement of goods of the type
dealt in by the bidder is naturally best qualified
to make this evaluation, and broad discretion is
accordingly reserved to the service in this respect.
Contracting officers have the criteria set forth in
the Armed Services Procurement Regulation 1-307 as their
guide in determining the responsibility of bidders. However,
these conditions are subject to varied interpretation, and
it is encumbent upon the contracting officer to judiciously
examine each element to assure that he is able to answer any
challenge. Unfortunately, he must be able to support all of
his opinions with fact and, therefore, cannot exercise per-
sonal judgment to much degree.
Among numerous factors to be considered in determining
the responsibility of bidders, the contracting officer musts 2^
establish that the prospective contractor is a
manufacturer or regular dealer in the supplies sought;
that he has adequate financial resources; that he can
comply with the delivery schedule; that he has a
satisfactory record of prior performance and integrity
and is otherwise qualified and eligible to receive an
award under applicable laws and regulations.
22
Senate Committee on Armed Services, Report No. 571
ASPA , 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 16.
23Senate Subcommittee on Armed Services, Procurement
Study Hearings
. I960, Part I, p. 66,
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Answers to these questions require careful investigation which
is normally accomplished by a preaward survey and involves a
determination of qualifications to perform, including in
many cases an evaluation of quality control and inspection
methods and procedures. Contracting officers are well aware
of the type characters portrayed in Figure 2 and are legally
prohibited to deal with them.
Comparative Costs with Negotiation
The matter of whether formal advertising or negotia-
tion administrative costs are higher is difficult to assess
as they depend upon the nature of the item and the complexity
of the procurement. Paper work expenses might be higher in one
instance in formal advertising due to wider solicitation; how-
ever, these costs oould be exceeded by utilizing more of a
buyer's time in conducting negotiations. A few years ago the
Army made an analysis on subsistence procurement and determined
that In the experiment negotiation administrative costs were
only 60% of formal advertising costs. Unless watched for,
paperwork can cost more than the material purchased, especially
24
where voluminous specifications are involved. Small purchases
are made by negotiated Imprest Fund and Blanket Purchase methods
for economy and speed. It is not believed in the best interest
of the taxpayer to continue the "open door" solicitation policy
of formal advertising, especially on low-cost buys. Under
24
"The Truth About Military Buying", Purchasing
Magazine
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present regulations , the contracting officer may restrict
the solicitation of bids on formal advertising by reasonable
rotation of bidder's mailing lists. However, any supplier
may also participate upon request. Contracting officers
should be allowed discretion and be permitted to restrict
solicitations in consideration of the item value.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the amount of paper work
involved for two formal advertised procurements, but as
explained above
,
paper work is only one element of the total
cost in a purchase shop. Figure 4 does, however, show how
much longer it may take to procure an item in the G-overnment
by formal advertising compared with the time for industry.
Ironically , legislators have assailed the G-overnment
for not adopting ordinary business practices, but they are
critical of negotiation which is the "manner common among
businessmen." Only a few companies use the advertised bid
procedure similar to the Government, but without the full
rigidity. 25 As a rule, purchasing agents in private industry
are free of the array of regulations such as the Service con-
tracting officers must abide by. Whatever the industry user
wants is invariably what he gets . If his budgeted funds are
limited, the purchasing agent can bargain around that figure
and, with the user's permission, he can easily decide on less
expensive equipment features without getting embroiled in
25




























massive "red tape". On the other hand, the military purchas-
ing officer is generally bound to inflexible specifications
on formal advertising and must seek the lowest responsive
price.
Unsupported Criticism
In response to a request for specifics regarding
testimony by Mr. Welch of the GAO that it was "inconceivable"
that "some" of the 4 million contracts negotiated by the
military departments from July 1, 1958 through March 31, 1959,
"could not have been formally advertised," the Comptroller
General stated: 2^
We have not made an overall study of the determina-
tions and decisions of heads of agencies and other
departmental procurement officials for the purpose
of ascertaining the incidence of use of the authority
to negotiate in cases where It might be our opinion
that such use was improper. Generally, specific
Instances of negotiated contracts which could and
should, properly have been negotiated are called to
our attention primarily through the medium of pro-
testlve suppliers or manufacturers who believe that
they could have supplied the needs of the Government
if such needs had been advertised but who were pre-
cluded from competing on an equal basis by the
negotiation process.
We, therefore, are unable to estimate the number,
or dollar amounts, of negotiated contracts that could,
and properly should, have been formally advertised
for the period in question when representatives of
the General Accounting Office testified that it seemed
inconceivable that some of the 4 million negotiated
contracts could not have been formally advertised,
it is only fair to say that this is an opinion based
upon a small number of cases encountered in the form
of protests from potential suppliers during the course
of special investigations or based upon a limited
26Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed
Services, Military Procurement Hearings . 1959, p. 663.
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examination of published notices of intention to
negotiate procurements.
It is admitted, therefore, that the General Accounting
Office has not adequately sampled military procurements to
ascertain whether or not the Services are violating ASPR
in this respect. It is believed that a serious and comprehen-
sive study of facts, with an appreciation for military opera-
tional requirements, would provide the GrAO with a realization
that the Services are complying with the spirit and language
of the Act.
Need for Procurement Flexibility
The following statement by Senator Saltonstall points
up clearly the danger of stressing the rigid methods of formal
advertising: 2?
If new weapons development is to keep pace with
our critical space age needs, procurement processes
must be accelerated. Congress should not delay in
discarding obsolete requirements which not only slow
down the developmental process for modern weapons but
also are a drain upon engineering and administrative
talent and upon the taxpayer's dollar.
27





The Armed Services Procurement Act of 194-7 specifies
procurement by formal advertising as the general rule , but
permits negotiation in 17 listed exceptions. Fortunately, the
flexibility offered by these exceptions have enabled the Services
to continue procurement of advanced technological weapons on
timely schedule. However, these exceptions must be fully
supported by cited facts, and these facts together with deter-
minations made in light of them become part of the public
record of the procurement.
In the main, the Armed Services Procurement Act is a
consolidation of numerous exceptions that either Congress had
authorized by prior legislation or that were the result of
administrative interpretation of Rev. Statute 3709. The first
ten exceptions and the seventeenth fall within this category.
The other six exceptions were the outgrowth of World War II
procurement experience. All of these six necessitate a prior
personal finding or determination by the head of department






The Secretary of the department concerned must
personally make the required determination and findings in
all cases except for negotiated research and development
contracts not in excess of $25, 000 , which he may delegate
to another official. Also, the authority to make determina-
tions and findings regarding advanced payments and method of
contracting may be passed downward to the contracting officer. 9
It is therefore apparent that the power to make decisions on
determinations and findings is assiduously guarded and controlled
at Secretary level.
Section 2(c) 15 of the Armed Services Procurement Act
authorizes the negotiation of purchases and contracts after
advertising by the Secretary if
the purchase or contract is for property or services
for which he determines that the bid prices received
after formal advertising are unreasonable as to all
or part of the requirements, or were not independently
reached In open competition, and for which (a) he has
notified each responsible bidder of intention to
negotiate and given him reasonable opportunity to
negotiate; (b) the negotiated price is lower than
the lowest rejected bid of any responsible bidder,
as determined by the head of the agency; and (c) the
negotiated price is the lowest negotiated price offered
by any responsible supplier.
This exception is employed for the protection of the Government
in Instances where formal advertising is initially used but
results in excessive or collusive bids. 30
Oft
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The fallacy that negotiation Is not a competitive
method of procurement remains fixed in the minds of many
critics. Contrary to some belief, it is not a secrecy-
shrouded affair. In negotiated contracts the requirements of
lowest price and responsiveness are considered, similar to
formal advertisings but In negotiation other basic elements
are considered as well, particularly technical factors $, so that
the Government obtains best value at reasonable cost. As stated
in Senate hearings, "When the type of contract appropriate to
the circumstances at hand is properly selected and skillfully
negotiated by the contracting officer and the negotiator, there
is greater assurance of a successful contract."-5 Whether one
source or several are considered, the essence of the negotiation
technique is to induce the best possible proposal to be sub=
mitted for consideration by the purchaser. Where there Is only
one source, negotiation permits exploration of costs, exchange
of views on price and other matters whereas formal advertising
does not. Negotiation actually Increases competition "by
inducing bidders to match themselves against one another on
the essential and critical factors, cost included."-5 An
experienced negotiator can stimulate the Initiative and Imagi-
nation of suppliers, call upon their boundless technical
31
Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed
Services, Hearings. Procurement Study , I960, Part I, p. 79.
32
B. Bielman, p. 17.
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knowledge, obtain the best know-how, and procure requirements
at lower costs.
The extent of active competition in negotiation is
described concisely as follows P^
o . . there is bargaining and competition where
this is feasible; but instead of the mailing or
public posting of formal invitations to bid, quotations
or proposals (supported by statements of estimated cost
or other satisfactory evidence of reasonble price)
are requested from qualified sources of supply for
the particular supplies or work being procured. There-
after, on the basis of these quotations or proposals,
and without any public opening, the contracting officer
for the Government negotiates a contract with that supplier
or suppliers who offer the best deal to the Government,
. . . Individual bargaining is usually conducted by
mail or conference; but award, may also be made as a
result of competitive negotiation without bargaining
by accepting the most favorable offer initially received
if the contracting officer regards it to be fairly and
reasonably priced. In short, with procurement by nego-
tiation the Government is, generally, free, like any
other piirchaser, to do business with whichever supplier
seems to offer the most satisfactory terms.
The following assertion criticized negotiated
procurements
. . . the secrecy of negotiation is the spawning
ground for suspicion and fraud.
Secrecy is the negation of a public trust openly
administered. It is the substitution of the individual
for a "government of laws and not man. "34
It appears that this statement overlooks the fact that the
negotiation records are open for official review, that there
are existing administrative control checks and that the prices
of negotiated contracts are publicized after award. A further
33
Department of the Navy, Navy Contract Law (NAVEXOS
P-1995), p. 116.
34
House Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed
Services, Report on Study of ASPA a 1957, p. 643.
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assertion by the same committee was §
If negotiations are so important to the executive
department and it does a good Job, price and other
factors considered , why shouldn't the story be told?
. . . One of the means usually employed by bidders
in competitive fields is to examine the estimates
made by competitors whom they know in verification
of their own prices and products. 35
Certainly it cannot be expected that the contractor cost
analysis breakdown be made public information on negotiated
contracts. Contractors guard such information as strictly
private since competitors would gain considerable knowledge
of the business strategy as well as the process or manufacture
ing elements and techniques „ Many contractors would therefore
prefer not to bid if this data were not kept confidential.
Even where contracts are negotiated with one source
,
there Is usually competition present. When asked for informa-
tion In this regard during Senate hearings in 1959, the Defense
Department was caught without ready statistics and had to develop
such data by laborious methods. Based upon a sampling of 9
months of fiscal year 1959, the Air Force estimated 89% of the
one source dollar value had design competition , the Navy esti-
mated 70$ had design or technical competition, and the Army
estimated 93% had some form of competition. Therefore, the
preponderance of money obligated by the awards listed as
"negotiated with one source" actually resulted from competitive
designs or proposals „^&
35 lbid ., p. 688.
16
Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed
Services, Military Procurement Hearings , 1959, PP. 106-107.
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Whenever the negotiation method is used, except for
small purchases, bidders must submit (1) price quotations,
(2) usually statements and analyses of estimated costs or
other evidence of reasonable prices and (3) other vital
matters. Negotiations are conducted by the contracting offi-
cers and their negotiators with due attention tos^
lo Comparison of prices quoted, and consideration
of other prices for the same or similar supplies or
services, with due regard to production costs,
including extra-pay shift, multi-shift and overtime
costs, and any other factor relating to price, such
as profits, cost of transportation, and cash discounts;
2. Comparison of the business reputations, capa-
bilities, and responsibilities of the respective persons
or firms who submit quotations
„
3- Consideration of the quality of the supplies or
services offered, or of the same or similar supplies or
services previously furnished, with due regard to the
satisfaction of technical requirements,?
4. Consideration of delivery requirements
?
5. Discrimination use of price and cost analyses
?
6. Investigation of price aspects of any important
subcontract
?
7« Individual bargaining by mall or by conference
?
8. Consideration of cost sharing?
9. Effective utilization in general of the most
desirable type of contract and in particular of contract
provisions relating to price redetermination?
10. Consideration of the size of the business concern?
lie Consideration as to whether the prospective supplier
is a planned producer under the industrial mobilization
program?
37
Armed Services Procurement Regulation , Department of
Defense Directive 4105.30, 1 Dec. 1952 (Washington? U. S.
Government Printing Office), par. 3-101.
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12. Consideration as to whether the prospect ive
supplier requires expansion or conversion of plant
facilities;
13. Consideration as to whether the prospective
supplier is located in a surplus or scarce labor area;
14. Consideration as to whether the prospective
supplier will have an adequate supply of qualified
labor;
15. Consideration of the extent of subcontracting;
16. Consideration of the existing and potential
workload of the prospective supplier;
17. Consideration of broadening the industrial
base by the development of additional suppliers;
18 o Consideration of whether the contractor requires
Government-furnished property , machine tools , or facili-
ties; or Government-operated test facilities;
19. Consideration of contract performance in
facilities located in dispersed sites; and
20 „ Advantages or disadvantages to the Government
that might result from making multiple awards.
Documentation and Analysis
As a member of a Contract Review Board for two years
at a large purchasing activity, this writer witnessed a commend-
able performance by Navy civilian negotiators who were very
conscientious in obtaining the best buy in the Government
interest. Negotiators kept their files well-documented and
presented their cases in an expert manner. I can recall no
case where the action recommended by the negotiator did not
stand up under careful analysis of all factors, policy and
business o The assertion by some legislators and newspapers
that Service buyers are substandard or irresponsible is an
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unfair generality and an affront to many loyal, capable
civil servants. As mentioned In Furoha s ing Maga z ine
,
A lot of people who try to make a little legitimate
profit on contracts with the Government have a
completely different opinion. . . . The average
Armed Forces buyer is at least as well educated
as his civilian counterpart; college graduates are
the rule not the exception. . . . When it comes to
purchasing trainings, the Armed Forces have no equals
in private industry. 38
Hon. Courtney Johnson,, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army,
supported this viewpoint when he stated?
For many years prior to my present work with the Army,
I was in the contracting business, and I dealt exten-
sively with the placing of contracts for my Company,
Defense Department contracts, and the administration
of those contracts. ... I can only say that it is
a most meticulous process. Every detail of the award
of those contracts is checked and checked by men who
really know what they are doing, and everything is
safeguarded to the maximum extent. 39
During negotiations and considerations of the twenty
factors listed heretofore, the negotiator is able to determine
the quality and quantity of the research or production required
the ability or capacity to perform, the need for additional
facilities, the type of contract and the price to be paid. As
testified by CDR J. M. Malloy, Office of SECDEF, °
"? o
-^
"The Truth about Military Buying". Purchasing
Magazine
,
October 1957, pp. 121, 127. ~
39
U. S. Congress, House, Subcommittee for Special
Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services, Hearings
on the Study of the Armed Services Procurement Regulations and
Departmental Implementation Thereto , 85th Cong., 2d Sess.,
July 16-18, 1958, p. 4.
40Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services,
Military Procurement Hearings . 1959, p. 140.
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Our experience has shown that we can and do
save large amounts of Government funds by
critically examining the price which is
initially quoted. By providing appropriate
pricing techniques , we can eliminate substantial
amounts which a contractor would otherwise include
In his price to cover contingencies. Such flexible
pricing techniques as price redetermination cannot
be utilized in formally advertised contracts.
Neither could we take advantage in a formally
advertised transaction of Improved designs and
specifications which are often brought to light
during the negotiation procedures.
Contract Selectivity
Unlike formal advertising which restricts the type
of contract to firm fixed-price, with or without escalation,
negotiation allows for a variety of contract types, with
selection of the type to fit the situation. Since it is
near impossible to forecast all costs on new
s
complex procure-
ments, bidders are reluctant to accept blind ri3ks and demand
financial protection In many contracts.
Fixed™price contracts are to be used for negotiated
contracts as well unless one of the following allowed types
fit the particular situations (1) Cost-reimbursement
contract y (2) special incentive contract or (3) special-
purpose contract. The type of contract and pricing are
interrelated and, therefore, are considered together in
negotiation. Some of the factors considered in determining
41the appropriate type of contract are?
1. The type and complexity of the item;
2. The urgency of the requirement;
41
Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed
Services, Hearings , Procurement Study 9 I960, Part I, p. 80.
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3. The period of contract performance and the
length of the production run?
4. The degree of competition present;
5. The difficulty of estimating performance
costs due to such factors as the lack of firm
specifications, the lack of production experience,
or the instability of design;
6. The availability of comparative cost data,
or lack of firm market prices or wage levels;
7. Prior experience with the contractor;
8. The extent and nature of subcontracting
contemplated;
9« The assumption of business risk;
10. The technical capability and financial
responsibility of the contractor; and
11. The administrative cost to both parties.
Advantages
In summarization, the following advantages are
inherent in negotiations^"2
1. Negotiation enables exploration of the
proposers' cost data for the opportunity to eliminate
unnecessary costs based on misunderstood requirements!
correction of unsound allocations of cost; detection
of straightforward errors of computation, if revealed;
and most important, waiving of contingency factors for
possible future situations by employment of appropriate
price=>adjustment provisions or contract types.
2. Negotiation contracts and discussions with
sources enable a partial evaluation of a potential
contractor's competence.
3. Negotiation is the tool for eliciting technical
contributions in the form of suitable proposals for
attaining a desired end-result; or even a sounder
counter-proposal from a business standpoint when the
contractor has the opportunity to understand, to
absorb the ultimate objective.
^2B. Edelman, pp. 26-2?.
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4. Negotiation is the necessary method for
putting the project in the proper or best spot or
source when the controlling considerations are
either technical competences support of mobilization
plans, small business policy, labor area relief,
attaining the economies of standardization, or
employing existing facilities.
5. Negotiation is the means of procuring
within a minimum of time, or when urgency dictates.
6. Negotiation should when employed by competent
personnel and under appropriate management controls,
result in greater economy, considering the price paid
and cost of procurement effort.
7. Negotiation enables development of a more
competent, more stable buying force through utilization
of more individual Initiative and ability, and by en-
couraging careers for able personnel through maximizing
their opportunities for contributions.
8. Negotiation permits keeping uppermost in mind,
as decisions have to be made, whether the National




Two Step Formal Advertising
The Two Step Formal Advertising method of procurement
consists of (1) submission and evaluation of technical pro-
posals without pricing to determine acceptability of the
products offered, and (2) issuing invitations for bids only
to those firms having acceptable proposals. It is used where
specifications are not adequately definite to permit full and
free competition by formal advertising. Upon negotiating
acceptable understandings, a fixed price contract can then
result from formal advertising procedures. Each bidder sub-
mits his price based upon the specifications and his Bidder's
Proposal as accepted under the Letter Request for Technical
Proposal.
At the suggestion of Subcommittee for Special Investi-
gations, House Armed Services Committee, the Air Force has
experimented with the new method and has used it in 108
instances ($40 million value) between April 1957 and 30
June 1959. Also the Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Department,




and as personnel gained familiarity with the new procedure,
the average time was reduced to approximate that for standard
actions. All members of the Armed Services Procurement
Regulations Subcommittee, Office of Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Supply and Logistics, approved of the new method
for adoption and the committee is continuing in its work pre-
paring proper regulatory language. 3
It appears to the writer that two-step formal
advertising is merely another means of arriving at a speci-
fication, and seems to offer no advantage over competitive
negotiation. The Navy Procurement Directives and Navy policy
for awarding R&D contracts recognizes that technical pro-
posals are legitimate means for initiating contracts. There
does not seem to be much point in using this hybrid negotia-
tion-formal advertising procedure.
Further, the following questions come to mind concern-
ing two-step formal advertisings If we are limiting the actual
advertisement, that is in phase two, to those who have estab-
lished their qualification on the basis of phase one, is this
truly formal advertising in the sense of the statute? If set-
aside for small business are not considered as formal advertis-
ing, but rather as negotiation, can we on the other hand
classify this new method as formal advertising? At best,
4"3
•^Memorandum from Major Harvey E. Steinberg, USAF,
Chairman Subcommittee of the Armed Service Procurement
Regulations Committee, Subject; Case 59-66—Formal Advertising-
Two Step Procedure, August 31, 1959.
Department of the Navy, Navy Procurement Dire ctives




two-step formal advertising appears to be only a statistical
drill.
Pending Legislation
S. ROO (86th Cong.. 1st Sess.) Introduced by Senator Saltonstall
The purpose of this bill is to (1) cut down lead time
in the development of complex military equipment, and (2) to
improve the efficiency and economy of Government procurement.
Ac
The legislation proposes changes of existing statute to; J
1. Establish for the first time a complete policy
for Armed Services procurement.
2. Raise competitive negotiation to an equal
status with formal advertising.
3. Permit the unrestricted use of Cost-Plus-Fixed
Fee type contracts for research and development programs.
4. Establish performance specifications as the
preferred type of specification.
5. Recognize, define, and establish the basic
concept for operational systems" procurement.
6. Eliminate from renegotiation those types of
contracts wherein the reasonableness of the contractor's
profits have already been established by other methods.
In the main, the Saltonstall Bill contains several
favorable changes; however, a few changes to the bill suggested
46by the Department of Defense are listed as follows;
45
National Security Industrial Association, Washington,
D. C. Bulletin No. 142-59, Subject; Saltonstall Legislation to
Amend Title 10 of the U. S. Code with Respect to Procurement
Procedures of the Armed Services . June 5, 1959«
46
Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services,
Military Procurement Hearings , 1959, pp. 5-11.
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1. Procuring offices should be free to determine
whether the use of performance specifications, design
specifications j or a combination of both, would best
serve the interest of the Government.
2. Provision be included in contracts for the
prime contractor to agree to accomplish the maximum
amount of subcontracting to small business.
3. Emphasizing a single weapon system and a
single prime contractor is unduly restricted. Other
methods of management and procurement, which have proved
successful, should be permitted so that the type will
fit the case and allow greatest possible flexibility
in the procurement of weapon systems.
4. The word "weapons system" be used in lieu
of "operational system."
5. Renegotiation provisions be continued.
It is considered that the most significant part of the
Saltcnstall Bill would \pe to raise competitive negotiation to
an equal status with formal advertising as a method of procure"
ment. It is felt this feature alone will eliminate sufficient
management frustrations, resulting from the present law so as
to minimize the necessity for use of the weapons system procure-
ment, which is also a part of the bill. Apart from this thought,
the weapons system should be merely another means of procurement,
as recommended by the Defense Department, and should be used
only where no other means can be employed.
S. 1^8g (86th Confi. „ 1st Sess.) Introduced by Senator Williams
This bill would (1) require the head of the agency, in
permitting negotiation, to make determinations in conformity
with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, (2) to
provide uniform practices in negotiations, (3) to make effective
provision for use of competitive bidding and (4), to require
agency heads to make certain annual reports to Congress with

4?
respect to negotiated contracts.
In general the Defense Department opposes S. 1383,
and states that detailed, uniform regulations are already
found in the Armed Services Procurement Regulations. ' Further,
the proposed revision requiring formal determinations in advance
and a report to the Attorney General would be administratively
burdensome.
The comments of the Defense Department are concurred
in by this writer since the Williams Bill offers nothing not
already in existence, except additional reports.
S. ISTB (86th Cong. . 1st Sess.) Introduced by Senator Javits
In the opinion of Senator Javits, his bill would 8^"°
1. Spell out as firm policy that the utilization
of open, competitive bidding methods, as consistent
with National Security needs, is the Government's and
the public's best guarantee of economical, efficient
purchasing of goods and services by defense agencies;
2. Provide that where our national security requires
that open bidding be replaced by negotiation, such nego-
tiation shall be of a competitive nature to the maximum
degree possible and should involve two or more concerns;
and
3. Include among those factors already giving prime
consideration by the Armed services in awarding business
under the set-aside program that a fair proportion of
purchases be placed with (a) small business concerns,
(b) concerns located in areas of substantial labor sur-
plus, and (c) eligible suppliers who have received the
smallest share of business as well as being In different
geographical areas.
The Defense Department opposes the bill because the
procurement preferences would accord particular firms and







special areas. Further, the bill would either Increase the
taxpayer's burden or diminish the procurement dollar for
national defense. Many provisions in the bill already exist
and are in effect. In essence, the Javits bill provides for
wider use of formal advertising.
It appears to the writer that paragraphs 1 and 3
above are inconsistent and would create an administrative
nightmare. Already the Defense Department is heavily encum-
bered with requirements regarding small business and labor
surplus, which necessitate special effort by contracting
officers and detract from the primary objective of supporting
the Armed Forces with timely deliveries at minimum cost and
with high material reliability.
s. 2487 (86th Cong.. 1st Sess.) Introduced bv Senators Smathers
and Snarkman
S. 2487 would require the devising of a program for
defense subcontracting where contracts exceed $1 million and,
further, would explore opportunities for expanded participation
of small business in subcontracting. 9
H. R. 896 (86th Cong.. 1st Sess.) Introduced bv Ren. Philbin
This bill provides for restricting fiirther the use of
the 1? negotiation exceptions, increases the dollar limitation
to $2500, and establishes special reports to Congress.
49
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It is considered that the present exceptions are
sufficiently restrictive. The dollar limitation has already
been raised to $2500.
H. R. 5137 Introduced by Ren. Batg.s
This bill is a companion bill to the Saltonstall bill,
introduced in the House at Senator Saltonstall 's request , and
is substantially identical to his bill.
H. R.s 6964, 7002. 7061,, 7076. and 7090 Introduced by Reps .
Anfuso, Kilburn. Wharton „ and Barv„ respectively
These bills are identical to the Javits Bill, S. 1875.
S. 8141, H.R.s 184. 895o 6060, 6203, 6612 Q 6942 and 715050
These are miscellaneous bills which cover special con-
ditions affecting such matters as labor surplus, textile






1. The Armed Services Procurement Regulations be
amended to specify equal status and dignity for negotiation
and formal advertising, and for the use of either as appro-
priate for the occasion.
2. If item 1 above is not adopted, then 10 U. S.
Code 2304(a)(3) be changed to permit negotiation if the
aggregate amount is less than $10,000. This revision will
permit more expeditious and business-like processing of small
purchases in the open market.
3. In any event, the present Armed Services Procure-
ment Regulations not be made further restrictive. Though it
is considered unduly burdensome, at least it is workable in
its present form.
4. The Defense Department develop additional statistical
data, employing sampling techniques where practical, for timely
Congressional dissemination, and thus be better prepared to
assure Congress that the procurement function is being carried
out in a manner which is most advantageous to the G-overnment.
5. The Defense Department realign statistical data




6. A continuing evaluation of training programs be
instituted for positive indoctrination of procurement and
management personnel. Emphasis should be given to the need
for effective communications between personnel concerned
with procurement, especially between those who initiate and
specify requirements and those who actually buy.
7. A comprehensive, formal development program,
geared to contracting dollar limitations, be instituted to
attain proficiency. Duty assignments should relate contracting
responsibility to experience and training. It is understood
that the Air Force has such a policy and issues "warrants"
to designated military and civilian contracting officers.
8. Personnel with engineering education and experience
be inducted into the procurement program and trained as mili-
tary negotiators and buyers. It is far easier for engineers
to learn the businessman's language than vice versa.
9. Consideration be given by the Defense Department
to further publicize the bid and award results of competitive
negotiation similarly to formal advertising.
10. The archaic passive voice be discontinued in
military correspondence, at least In the procurement area.
Rather than say "it is determined . . .", let's say "i
determine . . . .
"
11. Contracting officers be allowed to amend an
existing uncompleted contract for repeat purchases of an
item if they consider the price reasonable and in other ways
is in the best interest of the G-overnment.

52
12. Defense Department, as a matter of policy,
avoid "over-reacting" to criticism and "second guessing"
of Congressional groups. Rather, it should continue good
management techniques in that delegation of responsibility
should not be accompanied by "straightjacket" and time-
consuming controls. Techniques such as pre-negotiation
clearances from levels higher than the immediate head of
the field purchasing activity should not be practiced.
These techniques be confined to the Head of the field
activity. 51
"The GrAOs What Price A Headline?", Armed Forces
Management
. April I960, p. 7.
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SUPPLIES OR SERVICES REQUESTED. U ief description
in non-technical language,
This will suplement description on request itself).
>. PURPOSE OF THIS PROCUREMENT
Evaluation Quantity _____
Initial Production Quantity _
Follow-On Production Quantity
If Follow-On Production Quantity answer __
7. UNITS PRODUCED OR ON ORDER TO DATE
8. ARE THERE ANY ESTIMATED FUTURE REQUIREMENTS? YES_
NO
If YES, indicate them below and give date and quantity
of next procurement of the
item (est.)
9. RECOMMENDED DOCUMENT
Mew Contract Amendment to Contract - If
checked, Why?
10. DELIVERY SCHEDULE OR COMPLETION DATE (State in terms
of definite month or months




ABOVE DELIVERY DATES ARE IF




SHOULD PREMIUM PRICES BE PAID TO MEET
SCHEDULE?
YES NO If YES, state
reasons below.
IF DELIVERY SCHEDULE IS REQUIRED , STATE SOURCE OF
REQUIREMENT?
J DELIVERY IS TO BE MADE
F.O.B. DESTINATION F.O.B. CARRIER AT OR
NEAR CONTRACTOR'S PLANT
5. METHOD OF SHIPMENT
_____
CARLOAD OR TRUCKLOAD LESS THAN C-LOAD
OR TRUCKLOAD
ESTIMATED UNIT SHIPPING WEIGHT
6. DESTINATION Qlf unknown, so state and
give a destination point for use in
evaluating freight)
.7. INSPECTION AT
Source Destination Other If other
explain in item_
18. ACCEPTANCE AT
Source Destination Other If other
explain in item,
19. IF QUANTITY VARIATIONS ARE ALLOWABLE, INDICATE % IMust
be 10* or less)
For Items over and/or under
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0. WILL THE GOVERNMENT SUPPLY MATERIAL
UNDER THIS CONTRACT?
Yes No If YES attach list
1. BASIS OF THE COST ESTIMATE IS
Past Contracts other







The largest item of cost is
22. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY -equirements check list
(DD Form 254).
Request for Proposals should be classified.
_________
Contractual Document should be classified.
The Procurement Requires, or may require, generation of,
or access to classified information by contractor personnel
in order to perform the contract. *
* (.Check here if the work to be performed under the contract may
require the
use of classified data by any contractor personnel, regardless
of whether the
*'
contractual document or the end product, i.e. the equipment or
services being
procured will be classified.
23. SPECIFICATIONS ARE:
_____
Formal Specifications U.e. Military, Federal, Experimental)




DRAWINGS: Drawings; (such as development
drawings or production manufacturing
drawings)
.
Are available (State what kind)
Are not available (State why not _
Other (describe below) .
.
THE GOVERNMENT





a right to the use of drawings, desight data,
models, etc. for the purpose of
soliciting competitive proposals.
IRequiring Activity will indicate whether the
Government has such rights after
consultation with Patent Counsel. References to
previous contracts for research
and development, pilot line procurement, or
production, will often divulge this
information,
)
QUALITY OF THE AVAILABLE SPECIFICATIONS AND DRAWINGS-
Could any responsible bidder follow these drawings
and specs and produce
the item. or - If no, what prevents
him from being able to do so.
TXeTj (No)
What steps are being taken to make drawings




7. QUALIFIED PRODUCTS LIST
Item is on the QPL (If checked, complete A below, if
not checked,
complete B)
SPECIFICATION NO. SPECIFICATION DATE
CLASS GRADE OR MODEL (If
applicable)
A (For example, in the procurement of a
certain type of adhesive, the infor-
mation desired is '•QPL-397-13, dated
26 June 1958, Type I, Class 1, Grade A.")
The specification
REQUIRES DOES NOT REQUIRE
qualifications testing or approval
List names and addresses of all
contractors on QPL for items to
be purchased.




If the first is checked, also
check whether requirements will or
will not be waived and complete the
specification No., etc.
SPECIFICATION NO. SPECIFICATION
CLASS DATE GRADE OR
MODEL
(if applicable)
28. IF ITEMS ARE NOT ON QPL, ARE SAMPLES REQUIRED
FOR TESTING OR APPROVAL?
Yes No If YES explain below
29. ARE THEY
Production Preproduction




GOVERNMENT FURNISHED PROPERTY. THE CONTRACTOR
WILL REQUIRE WILL NOT REQUIRE
Government Furnished Property to perform this contract. (If he will, list or
refer to such property below. ) Government Furnished Property includes Special
Tooling as defined in ASPR 13-101(e), Material as defined in ASPR 13-101(d),
Bailed Aircraft, etc.; but excludes industrial facilities, machine tools, and
related production equipment
.
SPECIAL TOOLING AS DEFINED BY SPR 13-101(e)
WAS REQUIRED _j-A'J NOT REQUIRED
under a previous contract for the same type of equipment.
I IS GOV'T-OWNED SPECIAL TOOLING AVAILABLE FOR PERFORMANCE OF THIS CONTRACT (If in
more than one plant specify below) Yes No
ACQUIRED UNDER CONTRACT No.(s) LOCATION(s) DOLLAR VALUE





IS TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION TO BE PROCURED UNDER THIS CONTRACT?
_




IF SUCH DOCUMENTATION IS BEING FH0CUHKD WILL IT CONTAIN INFORMATION PATENTED BY
or proprietary to contractor?
Yes No
.
IF PROPRIETARY DATA ARE REQUIRED AND THIS PR WILL RESULT IN A SUPPLY CONTRACT,
JUSTIFY THE NEED FOR SUCH DATA
,
EQUIPMENT DESIGNED AND CONTRACTOR CONTRACT NUMBER DATE DEVELOPMENT COMPLETED
DEVELOPED BY
,
ESTIMATED PRODUCTION LEAD TIKE (Months) ' ' J' NT ftCTOPS OTHER THAN THOSE LISTED
30VE REQUIRE A SUB-
STAKTIAL iwiTii-wu INVESTMENT OR AN EXTENDED
PERIOD OF PREPARATION FOR MANUFACTURERS
TC PRODUCE THhSE SUPPLIES (Explain)
EJ Yes / /No
,
INFORMATION ON LAST CONTRACT CONTRACT NO. CONTRACTOR WERE DELIVERIES ON SCHE-
FOR THESE SUPPLIES OR SERVICES DULE
i / Yes l_ / No
,
IF DELIVERIES ON PREVIOUS CONTRACT WERE SERIOUSLY DELINQUENT DESCRIBE CIRCUMSTANCES
,
LIST ANY ADDITIONAL CONTRACTORS THAT HAVE SUCCESSFULLY PROVIDED OR ARE PRODUCING
THE SAME OR SIMILAR ITEMS
CONTRACTOR CONTRACT NO. ITEM UNIT PRICE/COST
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POSSIBLE SOURCES RECOMMENDED LIST $ AMOUNTS IF FIRM SCHEDULED
(Names and addresses) FIRMS IF FIRM HAS AS A MOBILIZATION
SUPPLIER FOR
Yes No Gov't Spec'l Reqtd Any other Security-
Facilities Tooling Item Item Clearance
4. EXPLAIN WHY COMPANIES NOT RECOMMENDED ABOVE ARE NOT QUALIFIED
(Separate detailed statement for each)
5. IF THERE IS TO BE A RECOMMENDATION FOR NEGOTIATION:
FOR EAC OF THE RECOMMENDED SOURCES INDICATE:
(a) Basis of evaluation,
(b) The significance of technical and spec:ia!l zed character of the item
(c) The basis for representation of advantageous lead time position
(d) Where the absence of specs & drawings is a factor in contractor selection
what steps are to be taken to obtain them and at what point is subsequent
procurements will they become available so as to permit competition.
!*6. ARE ALL MOBILIZATION SUPPLIERS IN ABOVE LIST/
Not
(_ / Yes / / No / / Applicable If NO explain in item
if. ARE ALL KNOWN SMALL BUSINESS FIRMS RECOMMENDED ABOVE
/ 7 Yes / 7 No If NO, explain in item
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IF A SMALL BUSINESS SEASIDE IS RECOMMENDED STATE OPTIMUM PROCUREMENT
QUANTITY ?
IF NOT RECOMMENDED, STATE REASON
), HAS THIS PROCUREMENT BEEN COORDINATED WITH OTHER ACTIVITIES:
EJ Y-es LJ No
0. ARE SPARE PARTS TO BE PROCURED? IF YES, INDICATE SUPPORT ACTIVITY tASO,GSSO,
BRASO, etc.)
EJ Yes EEL No
1. SPARE PARTS WILL BE PROCURED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
/ / Provisioning (_ /Attached / / Other If other is checked fully explain
Procedure List
formula to be used.
2. PRIORITY
IF PRIORITY DESIGNATOR IS 10 OR BELOW, INCH Of
'- T
' '"" TFICATI0N (,See BUSANDA
MANUAL 22001 and NAMC Inst 4830. ID)
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BUREAU EXPENDITURE OBJECT UNIT PRICE
3. ITEM APPROPRIATION CONTROL NO. ACCOUNT CLASS PROGRAM QUANTITY OR COST
14. /2Z7 COMPLETE FINANCIAL DATA IS IN ABOVE BLOCK /"^COMPLETE OR CONTINUATION OF
FINANCIAL DATA IS ATTACHED
5. PURCHASE ACTION IS RESTRICTED TO THE TOTAL monetary amount cited,
£ _/ Do not exceed amount cited hereon, or
/ / Do not exceed amount cited hereon by more than %
6. IF THE PURCHASE PRICE EXCEEDS THE ABOVE, obtain additional authorization
from .
7. ARE THERE SPECIAL QUALITY CONTROL conditions in the Specifications.
Yes No
If yes, describe nature of Quality Control Considerations, i.e. Critical
attributes listed, tests.
Are the sampling methods specified in MIL-S-501B appropriate?
Yes Wo~~
If so, give Acceptable Quality Level, Sampling Level, and classify defects (if
this information is not in specifications or drawing.)
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;8. RECOMMENDATION FOR ADVERTISING OR NEGOTIATION
I recommend that this New Procurement should be
Advertised Negotiated
If advertised, complete form except for sections designated by asterick. (*)
>9. JUSTIFICATION FOR NEGOTIATION. If you recommend that this New Procurement
should be negotioted: (a) State why the procurement cannot , rather than
should not, be made by advertising, and (b) Set forth facts rather than
conclusions which establish a basis for negotiatiating the procurement.
?0. INSTRUCTION OR TRAINING OF CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES
/ / Procurement is for the instruction or training of Navy Civilian employees
by a non-federal agency, educational institution, or industrial concern.
j1. PUBLICATION REQUIREMENTS. The purchase of publications
/ / Is included ( / Is not included
S2. PROCUREMENT OF TECHNICAL AND SPECILIZED MATERIAL. This procurement
/m / Covers / / Does not cover quantity purchase of component material
as herein defined.
/ / Only NAMC evaluation without BuWeps approval is required. If checked,
I
attach the required certification by the technical division Director
or Assistant Director.
/m / Major design modifications are contemplated
/ / An authorization by the Chief of BuWeps is required. If checked,
attach the BuWeps authorization or decision.
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3. WILL SPECS AND DRAWINGS BE SENT TO PROSPECTIVE BIDDERS
/ / If YES attach specs and dvrgs / / No
4. SPECIFY NO. AND TYPES OF DRAWINGS AND SPECS REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL BRANCH"
SUCCESSFUL CONTRACTOR, OR INSPECTION
5. DOES THE GOVERNMENT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE USE OF DESIGN DATA,MODELS, ETC. FOR THE
PURPOSE OF SOLICITING COMPETITIVE PROPOSALS?
CJ *• CJ No
;6. IS A MODEL AVAILABLE?
CJ Yes CJ No
$7. IF YES INDICATE WHAT TYPE
/ / Expermtl
/""/ Production / / Pilot prod, or preprod.
68. IF YES, CAN MODEL BE FURNISHED TO CONTRACTOR AS GOVERNMENT FURNISHED PROPERTY
HI Yes r~J No
69. INDICATE WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING REPORTS CLAUSES AND OTHER CLAUSES ARE REQUIRED
IN THE CONTRACT
/ / Production Progress Feport DD 375
/ 7 Financial Status Report of Contract DD 1097
£ /Technical Reports (Indicate their frequency, to whom, No. ©f copies of each
report, and when final report is to be submitted)
/ /Manufacturing Data, 0STD.100 (Required only if special tooling is required)




0. SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION": IF ANY
1
. OF CONTRACT DOCUMENTS
1. PREPARATION OR INVESTMENT
Period of Preparation For Manufacture (In Months)
Initial Investment - Preliminary Engineering and Development (dollars)
Initial Investment - Special Tooling (dollars)
Initial Investment - Industrial Facilities (dollars)
2. PRESENT SOURCE(s)( Actual) NEW SOURCES (Estimated)
3. ARE SUBSTANTIAL SPEC. CHANGES OR MODIFICATIONS EXPECTED?
n Yes ^~7No
4. HOW LONG WILL SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES CONTINUE? (Months) (Explain in item)
5. IS THIS PR FOR TECHNICAL OR NON-PERSONAL SERVICES FOR THE ASSEMBLY, INSTALLATION,
OR SERVICING OF EQUIPMENT OF A HIGHLY TECHNICAL OR SPECIALIZED NATURE?
(If Yes, explain fully in item)
/~1 Yes f~~J No
6. DOES THIS PR INVOLVE MAINTENANCE; REPAIR, ALTERATIONS OR INSPECTION. THE EXACT
NATURE OF WHICH CANNOT BE DETERMINED AT THIS TIME? (If Yes, explain in item)
I"! Yes £J No
7. TYPE OF GUARANTEE REQUIRED (If other, explain in item)
/ / Standard /' 7 Two years after dlvry or one yr after installation /~7othcr
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8. IS ITEM ON DOD PREFERENTIAL PLANNING LIST (PPL)?
£J Yes CJ No
If Yes, on DOD PPL No.
9. IS ITEM ON DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY SUPPLEMENTAL PUNNING LIST (DNSPL)?
(Item will not be both PPL and DNSPL) (If Yes answer )
£7 Yes CJ No
0. LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF PLANNED PRODUCERS
SI. JUSTIFY WHY THIS PROCUREMENT MUST BE AWARDED TO OTHER THAN PLA T1NED PRODUCER(s)
§. IS IT NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN MORE THAN ONE SOURCE FOR THESE SUPPLIES FOR
MOBILIZATION? (If Yes, answer )
/77 Yes CI No
INDICATE NUMBER OF SOURCES
33. STATE ANY STEPS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO ESTABLISH ADDITIONAL SOURCES AND RESULTS
OF SUCH STEPS
34. MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTS
£~~J Source is DD 754 Dated / / Other source (Specify)
78B Requirements M-Day Units ( + ) M-Day M-Day+ M-Day+
FOR R&D AND SOLE SOURCE REPRESENTATIONS
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5. STAGE OR PROGRAM
/ / Research / / Design of Hardware / / Further Development of Existing
Hardware
/ 7 Evaluation of Existing Hardware / / Engineering in Support of Production
6. DISCUSS THE OBJECTIVES OF THIS PROCUREMENT AND ITS RELATION TO ANY PREVIOUS OR
CONCURRENT CONTRACTS (including current status of program or project)
DISCUSS THE COMPLEXITY AND UNIQUE PROBLEMS ANTICIPATED IN THE WORK TO BE
PREFORMED
8. IS TECHNICAL DIRECTION REQUIRED? (If Yes, who will provide technical direction?)
f~~7 Yes f~l No
!9o IF HARDWARE IS TO BE PROVIDED ARE THEY
/ / Expermental models / / Developmental models / / Evaluation and Test
Quantities
'0. THE PURPOSE OF THE HARDWARE IS TO
/ / Determine Workability or Suitability of Design
/ J Evaluate operational characteristics or Service Suitability
/_ / Demonstrate Producibility
ZZ7 other
L IF SUPPLIES ARE TO BE FABRICATED FOR TESTS, TESTS ARE SCHEDULED FOR
DATE LOCATION
2, IS IT POSSIBLE TO DESCRIBE IN PRECISE DETAIL OR BY ANY DEFINITE DWGS. OR SPECS.
THE NATURE OF THE WORK TO BE PREFORMED UNDER THIS PROCUREMENT?
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ri Yes n^o (If No explain)
.
CAN ONLY THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES AND GENERAL SCOPE OF THE WORK BE OUTLINED?
/~7 Yes n No (If No explain)
.
SELECTION OF CONTRACTOR - IS IT NECESSARY TO OBTAIN TECHNICAL PROPOSALS TO
DETERMINE FIRM WITH HIGHEST TECHNICAL COMPETENCY
£J Yes £7 No
I SOLE SOURCE BECAUSE
/ / Most Technically Competent Firm
/ / Continuation of Program Already Undertaken By Congress
OTHER REASONS (Explain)
i. IF SOLE SOURCE IS RECOMMENDED, STATE REASONS WHY AN EQUAL DEGREE OF TECHNICAL
COMPETENCY CAN BE FOUND IN NO OTHER FIR!!, OR THE EXTENT OF PROGRAM PREVIOUSLY
UNDERTAKEN (i.e. dollars and time expended) AS APPLICABLE
7. IF TECHNICAL PROPOSALS ARE TO BE SOLICITED. HAVE ALL FIRMS BEEN EVALUATED TO
ASSURE THAT THEY ARE OF HIGH TECHNICAL COMPETENCE AND ARE QUALIFIED TO PREFORM
THIS PROCUREMENT
izj Y«» EJ N°
3. HAVE ALL REGULARLY AVAILABLE SOURCES OF INFORMATION BEEN SEARCHED IN COMPILING
LIST OF RECOMMENDED FIRMS
cj *« no no
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9. ESTIMATED CALENDAR DAYS RQD FOR CONTRACTOR'* RESPONSE
.00. REMARKS (Include any additional information that would justify the use of
negotiation)
.01. CERTIFICATION - I certify that the facts and representations under my cognizance
in this Procurement Request and its supporting papers are accurate to the best
of my knowledge and belief.
ORGINATOR (Signature, Ext.)
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